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THE DEPENDENCE OF CYBERSPACE
AMY LYNNE BOMSE
O, that this too too sullied flesh would melt—Thaw and resolve itself
into a dew!1
The fantasy that law works like a computer code, in sum, undergirds
the denial of history, social structure, and political struggle that is
central to the libertarian faith in markets . . . .2
INTRODUCTION
In 1996, John Perry Barlow, the founder of the Electronic Fron-
tier Foundation, published A Declaration of the Independence of Cy-
berspace,3 a response to the Telecommunications Act of 1996,4 that
President Clinton, “that great invertebrate in the White House,”5 had
just signed into law. Barlow vehemently rejected the right of any na-
tional government to create laws for cyberspace: “You have no moral
right to rule us nor do you possess any methods of enforcement we
have true reason to fear. . . . [C]yberspace does not lie within your
borders.”6 It is a mark of the tremendous influence of libertarian ide-
ology in cyberspace that a few years later President Clinton too en-
Copyright © 2001 by Amy Lynne Bomse.
1. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, HAMLET act 1, sc. 2, lines 129-30.
2. Thomas Streeter, “That Deep Romantic Chasm”: Libertarianism, Neoliberalism, and the
Computer Culture, in COMMUNICATION, CITIZENSHIP, AND SOCIAL POLICY 49, 58 (Andrew
Calabrese & Jean-Claude Burgelman eds., 1999).
3. John Perry Barlow, A Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace, Electronic Fron-
tier Foundation, at http://www.eff.org/barlow (Feb. 9, 1996) (on file with the Duke Law Jour-
nal).
4. Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 153 (Supp. 2000)).
5. Barlow, supra note 3.
6. Id.
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dorsed a conception of a regulation-free Internet:7 “For [the Inter-
net’s] potential to be realized fully governments must adopt a non-
regulatory, market oriented approach to electronic commerce.”8
Many legal scholars have expressed similar skepticism about the
appropriateness and feasibility of traditional state-enforced regula-
tion of activities within the new virtual landscape.9 These commenta-
tors describe the knotty problems of jurisdiction, legitimacy, notice,
and enforcement on the Internet. Many legal scholars express faith in
private or self-enforced regulation of cyberspace as a preferable al-
ternative to state-created laws.10 In the last couple of years, however,
some strong dissenting voices have emerged. Professor Jack Gold-
smith’s important article, Against Cyberanarchy, effectively punc-
tured some of the most common myths about the feasibility and le-
gitimacy (in the limited, legal sense) of state regulation of the
7. It is important to note a significant difference between the Clinton administration’s va-
riety of libertarianism and the Barlow variety. While Barlow sees intellectual property as a po-
tential threat to the development of the Internet, the Clinton administration viewed improved
intellectual property protection as the key to the Internet’s growth. For Barlow’s view, see John
Perry Barlow, Selling Wine Without Bottles: The New Economy of Mind on the Global Net, at
http://www.eff.org/pub/Publications/John_Perry_Barlow/HTML/idea_economy_article.html
(last visited Apr. 7, 2001) (on file with the Duke Law Journal). The Clinton administration ap-
proach is reflected in its Framework for Global Electronic Commerce, President William J.
Clinton & Vice President Albert Gore, Jr., A Framework for Global Electronic Commerce, at
http://www.ecommerce.gov/framewrk.htm (July 1, 1997) (on file with the Duke Law Journal),
and in its legislative handiwork, the Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-
304, 112 Stat. 2860 (codified in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C. (Supp. IV 1998)) (amending the
copyright law as a response in part to the signing of the World Intellectual Property Organiza-
tion Copyright Treaty and Performances and Phonograms Treaty).
More than a policy disagreement, this difference expresses a fundamental philosophical
tension within libertarianism. James Boyle, Net Total: Law, Politics and Property in Cyberspace
(2000) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Duke Law Journal):
This isn’t just a disagreement as to tactics among people who might be said to share
the same ideology: it is a fundamental set of disputes over the very social construction
and normative significance of a particular phenomenon—as if the Libertarian party
couldn’t agree on whether its motto was to be “Taxation is theft” or “Property is
theft.”
8. Clinton & Gore, supra note 7.
9. E.g., Dan L. Burk, Federalism in Cyberspace, 28 CONN. L. REV. 1095, 1096 (1996) (de-
scribing the impact of Internet regulation on federalism); I. Trotter Hardy, The Proper Legal
Regime for “Cyberspace,” 55 U. PITT. L. REV. 993, 994 (1994) (addressing whether the existence
of cyberspace really raises novel legal issues); David R. Johnson & David Post, Law and Bor-
ders—The Rise of Law in Cyberspace, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1367, 1367 (1996) (arguing that “new
rules will emerge to govern” cyberspace).
10. E.g., David Post, What Larry Doesn’t Get: Code, Law, and Liberty in Cyberspace, 52
STAN. L. REV. 1439 (2000) (offering a critique of Lessig’s warning about the role of commerce
in the rise of control mechanisms in cyberspace and advocating a reliance on spontaneous, or-
ganic methods of regulation).
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Internet.11 Professor Lawrence Lessig’s book Code12 is certainly the
most prominent of such critiques. Lessig argues that digital libertari-
ans are blind to the way the Internet is moving towards an architec-
ture of control.13
The project of this Note is slightly different. Building on the im-
portant groundwork that dismantles some of the claims made by digi-
tal libertarians, this Note sets out to understand the philosophical un-
derpinnings of Internet libertarianism. It therefore is attentive to the
language and narratives offered by digital libertarians as much as it is
attentive to their substantive arguments. This Note aims to suggest
the limits of self-regulation claims for the Internet and to examine
how particular notions of individuality and freedom undergird the
libertarian model. I argue that the apparent natural kinship between
the Internet and libertarian philosophy reveals as much about liber-
tarianism—which is, ultimately, at the heart of most American politi-
cal philosophies—as it does about digital communication media.
This Note grows out of two experiences during my time in law
school. In my first semester as a law student, my property law profes-
sor assigned a few pages from an essay titled Law, Boundaries, and
the Bounded Self.14 The author argued that our conception of prop-
erty rights is not inevitable but is, instead, historically contingent on
the political forces that were at work during the founding of the na-
tion. Moreover, the notion of property as a metaphor for human lib-
erty produces a particular notion of individualism that sees the indi-
vidual as a self-enclosed, separate entity.15 This essay gave me a
framework and language to articulate my inchoate, intuitive re-
sponses to certain individualistic assumptions within liberal legal
thought. The second experience was the summer I spent at the Fed-
eral Trade Commission’s Consumer Protection Bureau. At the FTC, I
11. Jack L. Goldsmith, Against Cyberanarchy, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 1199, 1200-01 (1998) (of-
fering a descriptive critique of the skeptical view of territorial regulation of cyberspace).
12. LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE (1999); see also James Boyle, Foucault in Cyberspace: Sur-
veillance, Sovereignty, and Hardwired Censors, 66 U. CIN. L. REV. 177 (1997); Julie E. Cohen,
Lochner in Cyberspace: The New Economic Orthodoxy of “Rights Management,” 97 MICH. L.
REV. 462, 494-95 (1998) (describing the revived romance with laissez-faire economics within the
digital realm); Neil Weinstock Netanel, Cyberspace Self-Governance: A Skeptical View from
Liberal Democratic Theory, 88 CAL. L. REV. 395, 405-06 (2000) (arguing that self-governance is
inconsistent with liberal ideals).
13. LESSIG, supra note 12, at 5.
14. Jennifer Nedelsky, Law, Boundaries, and the Bounded Self, in LAW AND THE ORDER
OF CULTURE 162 (Robert Post ed., 1991).
15. Id.
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saw how the challenges to consumer protection law enforcement
posed by new digital technology were compounded by political confu-
sion over who would enforce the law.16 A newly visible high-tech
lobby had emerged, and political pressures against regulation added
to the logistical difficulties facing consumer protection efforts.17
I offer these biographical tidbits in the interest of full disclosure:
I am dissatisfied with an individual-centered notion of liberty, and I
am a believer in corny, New Deal institutions like the Federal Trade
Commission. My world view shapes my reading of libertarian argu-
ments. But claims to hardheaded realism notwithstanding, libertarian
descriptions of the Internet are colored by a particular world view,
too. In Code, Lessig argues against “‘is-isms.’”18 The Internet, he ar-
gues, can be many things. Although this Note focuses on the power of
narratives rather than the power of computer code, I echo the claim
that the Internet is at a crossroads. This Note is a signpost pointing in
another direction.
In Part I, I discuss the contested meaning of the history of the
Internet. I ask whether we read the Internet as a successful example
of government-private cooperation fueled by a non-proprietary ethos
or as the final frontier of the free market. Part II considers the argu-
ments against government intervention and the claim that cyberspace
does not require regulation by states because, left to its own devices,
it will be self-ordering. Part III situates today’s digital libertarianism
within an American historical context. In particular, I suggest that the
American conception of individual freedom derives from a meta-
phoric pairing of rights with property ownership developed and relied
upon by the Framers of the Constitution. Although this metaphor
helped ground an abstract idea, it is important to consider the limits
the metaphor has imposed on the conception of the individual. Al-
though the digital libertarian argument relies heavily on the intangi-
bility of the Internet, I will argue that its assumptions are based upon
a particular notion of the individual that is grounded in the metaphor
of the natural self, the self as property. Part IV offers a few counter-
16. See Glenn R. Simpson, Clinton Is Unlikely to Back FTC Efforts for New Power to
Regulate Web Privacy, WALL ST. J., May 22, 2000, at A3 (describing a dispute between the FTC
and the White House over expanding the FTC’s powers).
17. See Liberty.com, ECONOMIST, Oct. 30, 1999 (describing the boom in presidential
lobbying by the high-tech industry).
18. LESSIG, supra note 12, at 25 (“There is no single way that the Net has to be; no single
architecture defines the nature of the Net.”).
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narratives which situate the Internet within, rather than beyond, the
world of politics and history.
I.  THE CONTESTED HISTORY OF THE INTERNET
A. Call Me ARPANET
Internet history is a problem for digital libertarians. The claim
that cyberspace is a stranger to government intervention founders on
the actual history of the medium and the role the United States gov-
ernment played in establishing the Internet. The story begins in the
1950s, when the Eisenhower administration created the Advanced
Research Project Agency (ARPA) to coordinate military research
and development.19 The first incarnations of e-mail and hypertext
were developed within ARPA-funded research projects at MIT and
the Stanford Research Institute.20 Together, these organizations and
other ARPA-funded institutions linked their computers into the first
collaborative research network called the ARPANET.21 In 1969, there
were four nodes on this network; at its first public demonstration, in
1972, there were twenty-nine.22
The ARPANET was a product of the Cold War. The Depart-
ment of Defense’s goal was to create a communication medium that
was decentralized and therefore less vulnerable to attack.23 The com-
puters in the network were linked so that if one computer was dam-
aged the network could route around it. The computers were able to
share information because they all used the same language or proto-
cols: TCP/IP.24 To decrease travel time, information was broken up
into smaller packages that traveled independently and were reassem-
bled at their final computer destination.25 The new network became
19. Ironically, digital libertarians mocked Al Gore’s term for cyberspace, the “information
superhighway,” as redolent of Eisenhower-era big government construction projects. E.g.,
Esther Dyson et al., Cyberspace and the American Dream: A Magna Carta for the Knowledge
Age, Progress & Freedom Found, at http://www.pff.org/position.html (Aug. 22, 1994) (rejecting
the metaphor of the information superhighway as misleading and not descriptive of the nature
of cyberspace) (on file with the Duke Law Journal).




24. Jane Kaufman Winn, Open Systems, Free Markets and Regulation of Internet Com-
merce, 72 TUL. L. REV. 1177, 1188 (1998).
25. Id. at 1188-89.
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so popular among researchers and academics that traffic became un-
manageable on the ARPANET, and the National Science Foundation
(NSF)26 created a compatible network for nondefense research. Un-
der NSF sponsorship, the Internet became a federally funded network
for the academic and research communities.27 However, due in part to
NSF’s Acceptable Use Policy, which prohibited commercial uses of
the network backbone, the Internet remained a commerce-free zone
through the 1980s.28
In fact, while the NSF was developing the Internet as a non-
commercial communications network, commercial enterprises, par-
ticularly banks, developed their own electronic data interchanges,
which spawned credit card processing systems and then ATMs.29
When the Internet was opened to commerce in the 1990s, mainstream
corporations (including the largest player in the computer industry,
Microsoft) were unprepared. “[T]hey had spent the previous decade
investing in proprietary commercial on-line services like Prodigy, and
yet suddenly here was this superior system they neither controlled nor
understood.”30 In the 1960s, AT&T predicted that a packet-switched
network could not work and turned down the request from scientists
to help build the Internet.31 These egg-on-your-face stories conflict
with, and thus are omitted from, the story of the Internet as a triumph
of private entrepreneurialism.
26. The National Science Foundation was created in 1950 “to foster and support the devel-
opment and use of computer and other scientific and engineering methods and technologies,
primarily for research and education in the sciences and engineering,” among other purposes. 42
U.S.C. § 1862 (1994).
27. Walt Howe, A Brief History of the Internet, at http://www.walthowe.com/navnet/
history.html (last visited May 12, 2001) (providing a brief and readable history of the Internet
and the people involved in its creation) (on file with the Duke Law Journal).
28. Id.:
Since the Internet was initially funded by the government, it was originally limited to
research, education, and government uses. Commercial uses were prohibited unless
they directly served the goals of research and education. This policy continued until
the early 90’s, when independent commercial networks began to grow. It then became
possible to route traffic across the country from one commercial site to another with-
out passing through the government funded NSFNet Internet backbone.
29. Adriel Bettelheim, New Era in Digital Trade, CONG. Q. WKLY., Feb. 2, 1999, at 18.
30. Streeter, supra note 2, at 47, 49. Founded in 1984 and rolled out nationally in 1990,
Prodigy was one of the first online services. Prodigy.com, Company Information, at http://www.
prodigy.com/pcom/company_information/company_index.html (last visited April 1, 2001)
(chronicling Prodigy’s milestones) (on file with the Duke Law Journal). Until 1993 it offered
proprietary content to its members only. In 1993 it added a gateway to the Internet. Id.
31. LESSIG, supra note 12, at 44.
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B. “The Private Sector Should Lead”
The development of the World Wide Web, a user-friendly
browser, and the introduction of commerce in the 1990s profoundly
changed the nature of the Internet.32 Lessig differentiates these two
Internet epochs by referring to the pre-commercialized Internet as
“Net95.”33 According to Lessig’s argument, the expansion of com-
merce on the Internet created a need for new technologies to enable
secure transactions.34 These developments include methods of authen-
tication, such as passwords and cookies, and encryption for security
and confidentiality. Encryption and authentication changed the
Internet from a hard-to-regulate space to an ultra-regulated, or at
least ultra-regulatable, space.35 Ironically, as the nature of the Internet
shifted toward both greater controllability, with the arrival of encryp-
tion and identification tools, and greater significance in people’s lives
(thus creating more potential need and demand for regulation), the
rhetoric around the Internet became more militantly libertarian. At
the same time, it should be noted that despite the high-tech lobby’s
insistence that the Internet should not be subject to regulation, it has
not been shy about lobbying Congress for desired legislation, such as
32. Saskia Sassen, On the Internet and Sovereignty, 5 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 545,
546 (1998). An economist, Sassen says that we are currently in the third phase of the Internet.
The first and second phases, which Part I of this Note describes, were (1) the emergence of the
Internet when it was “confined largely to a community of insiders” and (2) the moment when it
opened up to a larger community. Id. at 547. The “large scale discovery [of the Internet and par-
ticularly the Web] by business by 1995” created the third phase, “characterized by attempts to
commercialize [the Internet].” Id. at 547-48.
33. LESSIG, supra note 12, at 27.
34. Id. at 30-42 (arguing that commerce requires architectures of identification that make
behavior on the Internet regulable).
35. Id. Although Lessig offers a pessimistic view of these changes, he does not oppose
regulation of cyberspace. His concern is that important regulatory decisions about the Internet
are being ceded to private parties. The overarching argument of Code is that the nature of the
Net is about to flip from an architecture of freedom to an architecture of control.
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increases in visas for foreign-born high-tech workers36 and indemnity
from Y2K liability.37
The first major battle between defenders of Internet freedom
and legislators was fought over the Communications Decency Act
(CDA).38 In 1996, as part of a massive telecommunications reform
bill, Congress passed the CDA, which prohibited obscene and inde-
cent speech made available to minors on the Internet.39 The CDA was
immediately challenged in two lawsuits: one brought by the ACLU
and other civil libertarian groups and the other brought by a collec-
tion of high-tech industry vendors such as America Online and Mi-
crosoft.40 Ultimately the Supreme Court struck down the CDA as a
violation of the First Amendment.41
Although supporters of the rejected CDA passed a revised ver-
sion, the Child Online Protection Act,42 the focus in the media shifted
shortly thereafter from pornography to commerce, and the Con-
gress’s attitude shifted from interventionist to laissez-faire. Only one
year after the CDA was passed, Representative William Tauzin,
Chairman of the Commerce Subcommittee on Telecommunications,
introduced the Internet Protection Act of 1997, which stated that “to
support rapid and efficient technological and commercial innovation,
36. In October 2000, Congress approved the American Competitiveness in the Twenty-
First Century Act of 2000, a bill to temporarily boost the number of available H-1B visas
through fiscal year 2003. 146 CONG. REC. S9651 (daily ed. Oct. 3, 2000). The rush to pass the bill
before the November 2000 elections suggests the current power of the technology industry.
Congress Clears H-1B Legislation in Surprise Move; President Clinton Expected to Sign, 77 No.
39 Interpreter Releases 1437 (Oct. 9, 2000) (“[L]awmakers can now rest a little easier knowing
that the powerful technology industry has been appeased, with just days to go before the No-
vember elections.”).
37. Alan K. Ota, With Clinton Agreeing to Caps on Damages, Y2K Liability Legislation
Clears Senate, 57 CONG. Q. WKLY. 1616, 1616-17 (July 3, 1999).
38. 47 U.S.C. § 223(d)-(h) (Supp. IV 1998); Sarah Varney, Senate, House Pass Telecom Bill
with CDA, CNET NEWS, at http://news.cnet.com/news/0,10000,0-1005-200-310555,00.html (Feb.
1, 1996) (on file with the Duke Law Journal).
39. The CDA adopted the definition of indecency created by the Supreme Court in
Pacifica v. FCC, 516 U.S. 1043 (1996). H.R. REP. NO. 104-458, at 188 (1995), reprinted in 1996
U.S.C.C.A.N. 174, 201-02. The Act made it illegal to “use an interactive computer service” to
either send or “make available” to persons under 18 any material that “depicts or describes in
terms patently offensive as measured by contemporary community standards, sexual or excre-
tory activities or organs.” 47 U.S.C. § 223(d) (Supp. IV 1998).
40. Rose Aguilar, Industry Leaders Pile on Decency Act, CNET NEWS, at http://news.cnet.
com/news/0-1005-202-310775.html (Feb. 26, 1996) (on file with the Duke Law Journal).
41. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 871-72 (1997) (voicing concern that the vagueness of the
CDA would chill protected speech).
42. 47 U.S.C. § 231 (Supp. V 1999), available at Center for Democracy and Technology,
http://www.cdt.org/legislation/105th/speech/copa.html (on file with the Duke Law Journal).
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deployment and adoption of Internet information services, it shall be
the policy of the United States to rely on private initiative and to
avoid, to the maximum extent possible, government restriction or su-
pervision of such services.”43 Senator John McCain proposed the
Internet Regulatory Freedom Act, designed to “prohibit the FCC and
state commissions from regulating . . . Internet access or online serv-
ices.”44
The Clinton administration was even more enthusiastic in its de-
sire to prove itself a friend to the high-tech industry. The Framework
for Global Electronic Commerce insisted that “the private sector
should lead.”45 The principal force behind the Clinton administra-
tion’s Internet policy was White House Internet “Czar” Ira Maga-
ziner,46 who began his White House career as the head of the commit-
tee that produced the much-maligned Clinton national health care
plan.47 The failure of the national health care initiative marked a
turning point for the Clinton administration and for Ira Magaziner.
“Initially, when health care failed I actually offered to resign,” Maga-
ziner told The New York Times.48 Instead he turned his attention to
the emerging Internet. “There really was almost no electronic com-
merce on the Internet then . . . . But it became very clear to me that if
we set the right environment, the Internet and electronic commerce
were going to explode.”49 The policy Magaziner developed for the
Clinton administration was entirely laissez-faire: “For [the Internet’s]
potential to be realized fully governments must adopt a non-
regulatory, market oriented approach to electronic commerce.”50
It would be wrong to suggest that the libertarian cast of cyber-
space came only from conservative think tanks or pocket-lining
43. Internet Protection Act of 1997, H.R. 2372, 105th Cong. § 2 (1997).
44. Internet Regulatory Freedom Act, S. 1043, 106th Cong. § 231 (1999).
45. Clinton & Gore, supra note 7.
46. John M. Broder, Man Behind Doomed Health Plan Wants Minimal Regulation of Net,
N.Y. TIMES, June 30, 1997, at B1.
47. Magaziner’s conflicted political biography encapsulates a shift in the broader political
discourse. The failed national health insurance policy was the grandchild of a particular, “New
Dealish” conception of government. It is possible to read the destruction of Clinton’s health
care plan as the final curtain on the era of major publicly funded government initiatives, an end
that, one might argue, led ineluctably towards the nonregulatory approach advocated in A
Framework for Global Electronic Commerce. See Clinton & Gore, supra note 7.
48. Jeri Clausing, Internet Commerce Study Stresses Self-Regulation, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 30,
1998, at B10.
49. Broder, supra note 46, at B1.
50. Clinton & Gore, supra note 7.
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CEOs. In fact, most of the original programmers and users of the
Internet probably subscribe to some version of antigovernment suspi-
cion. But in the transition from an idiosyncratic domain of a cyber-
intelligentsia to a highly commercialized mainstream medium, liber-
tarianism shifted quietly from its countercultural roots to a free-
market philosophy. As the first part of this Note illustrated, the
“rapid global spread” of the Internet was due in large part to “princi-
ples of open cooperation that are to some degree built into its de-
sign.”51 And yet, since the 1990s, when the Internet first became a sig-
nificant part of life and politics, it has become a symbol “not of
nonprofit principle or of cooperation between government and the
private sector but of a kind of romantic marketplace entrepreneurial-
ism—a ‘frontier.’”52
II.  ARGUMENTS FOR SELF-REGULATION
There are three parts to the digital libertarian critique of regula-
tion. First, there are descriptive arguments that focus primarily on the
nature of the Internet, its intangibility, and the absence of geographic
boundaries in virtual space.53 The network’s “structural indifference
to geographic position” is said to be “incongruous with the fundamen-
tal assumptions” of both personal jurisdiction and sovereignty that
underpin traditional territorially based laws made by national gov-
ernments.54 Electronic communications are said to “play havoc with
51. Streeter, supra note 2, at 51.
52. Id.; see also Dyson et al., supra note 19 (“The bioelectronic frontier is an appropriate
metaphor for what is happening in cyberspace, calling to mind as it does the spirit of invention
and discovery that led ancient mariners to explore the world, generations of pioneers to tame
the American continent . . . . Cyberspace is the latest American frontier.”). The use of the con-
cept of the frontier in discussions of new technology merits its own entire discussion. On the sur-
face it appears to call up two important libertarian ideals: first, that there is infinite, or at least
vast, space for individuality, and, second, that it is a space of great economic promise for risk-
takers. In other words, the image of the frontier marries stalwart individualism with entrepre-
neurial capitalism. But the frontier has another meaning, according to many Western historians.
It is a word used to cover up a history that is less congenial to the story the nation wants to tell
about itself. In a sense, then, the word “frontier” names neither a place nor a time but a narra-
tive act of rewriting the past. Patricia Nelson Limerick, The Adventures of the Frontier in the
Twentieth Century, in THE FRONTIER IN AMERICAN CULTURE 66, 68 (James Grossman ed.,
1994) (“Clear and predictable on most occasions, the idea of the frontier is still capable of sud-
den twists and shifts of meaning, meanings considerably more interesting than the conventional
and familiar definition of the frontier as a zone of open opportunity.”)
53. See generally Johnson & Post, supra note 9 (arguing that cyberspace presents a chal-
lenge to traditional law because it is not bounded by territorial or physical borders).
54. Burk, supra note 9, at 1009.
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geographic boundaries.”55 Some of the most interesting and far-
reaching theorizing about the proper rules (and rulemakers) has oc-
curred in a series of articles by David Post and David Johnson, who
together form the Cyberspace Law Institute.56 Post and Johnson ad-
vocate that legal critics and policymakers should “take cyberspace se-
riously” by abandoning traditional territorial borders and making use
of the already existing technological borders within cyberspace.57
Two more classical libertarian precepts build on the belief that
state regulation of the Internet is either infeasible or illegitimate: dis-
taste for government and faith in market regulation. Antagonism to-
wards government gets an added boost in the high-tech arena because
government is perceived as antithetical to the rapidly changing, highly
versatile character of the computer industry.58 Faith in the superiority
of the market as a regulator,59 of course, is not new to digital libertari-
anism. What is new is that, according to digital libertarians, cyber-
space, because it appears to solve some of the market failures that
justify state intervention in real space, makes a uniquely strong can-
didate for self-ordering.60 Aspects of these separate theories often co-
operate within particular articulations of digital libertarianism. Al-
though this Note is primarily interested in the positive claims made
about the capacity of the Internet to be self-ordering, this part begins
with a discussion of the major criticisms of state regulation made by
digital libertarians and responses to those criticisms.
55. Johnson & Post, supra note 9, at 1367.
56. Cyberspace Law Institute, at http://www.cli.org/default.html (last visited Dec. 1, 2000)
(on file with the Duke Law Journal).
57. Johnson & Post, supra note 9, at 1381.
58. John Perry Barlow, for instance, describes the world’s industrial governments as
“weary giants of flesh and steel.” Barlow, supra note 3.
59. Louis Rossetto, Re: Californian Ideology, Hypermedia Research Centre, at http://ma.
hrc.wmin.ac.uk/ma.theory.4.2.6.1.db (Sept. 18, 1998) (“The engine of development of the Digital
Revolution was not state planning, whether you call that an industrial policy or a defense policy.
It was free capital markets and venture funds which channelled savings to thousands upon thou-
sands of companies, enabling them to start, and the successful to thrive.”) (on file with the Duke
Law Journal).
60. See generally David R. Johnson, Let’s Let the Net Self-Regulate, Cyberspace Law Insti-
tute, at http://www.cli.org/selford/essay.htm (last visited Apr. 19, 2001) (describing numerous
forms of successful Internet self-regulation and arguing that there is currently no need for new
government protections) (on file with the Duke Law Journal).
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A. Technology—Parents Just Don’t Understand61
The simplest argument against government regulation of cyber-
space rests on a widely shared conception of government and its laws
as, frankly, passé. According to this argument, even if the Internet
originated as a government program, its success has occurred despite,
not because of, the government. Eric Raymond,62 an Internet devel-
oper and important figure in the Open Source movement, claims that
“most Internet policy has been made by default, often by individuals
within the government against the government’s stated intentions. . . .
A few far-sighted individuals at the DARPA [Defense Advanced Re-
search Projects Agency] deliberately flouted the ARPANET’s char-
ter, which restricted access to those directly working on research and
government contracts.”63 According to Louis Rossetto, the editor of
Wired, “Far from building the Digital Revolution, the US Defense
[D]epartment sucked up 6 to 7 percent of US GNP for 40 years.”64
Corporate leaders in the high-tech industry assert that government is
too centralized and slow, unable to move at “Internet rather than
Washington speed.”65 “Bottom up” private regulation in the form of
contracts or “netiquette,” the informal rules of behavior in cyber-
space, are seen as more flexible, and thus better-suited to “the tech-
nology of computer communications [which] is rapidly changing.”66
But the notion that governments are inherently slow is uncon-
vincing, because governments presumably can be made more efficient
by the very technology that requires such speed. Moreover, increasing
numbers of technically savvy young people are choosing to work in
politics.67 If digital libertarians want to insist that imperfections such
61. “You are terrified of your own children, since they are natives in a world where you
will always be immigrants. Because you fear them, you entrust your bureaucracies with the pa-
rental responsibilities you are too cowardly to confront yourselves.” Barlow, supra note 3.
62. For more information on Eric Steven Raymond, visit his website, http://www.tuxedo.
org/~esr/ (last visited Apr. 19, 2001) (containing links to open-source software, his writings, and
background information).
63. Eric S. Raymond, Controversy: Should Public Policy Support Open-Source Software?,
AmericanProspect.org, at http://www.prospect.org/controversy/open_source/raymond-e-1.html
(last visited Apr. 19, 2001) (on file with the Duke Law Journal).
64. Rossetto, supra note 59.
65. Liberty.com, supra note 17, at 23 (quoting Andy Grove, the head of Intel).
66. Id.
67. Lawrence Lessig, Innovation, Regulation, and the Internet, AM. PROSPECT, Mar. 27-
Apr. 10, 2000, at 26 (describing a meeting on Capitol Hill with a group of young, Internet-savvy
staffers).
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as the “digital divide”68 are merely passing phases, why should the
presence of some technical illiterates in government be any more
permanent? 69 The computer culture’s conviction that politicians never
really “get” technology relies on a particularly rigid conception of
legislation—one that sees only unimaginative laws based on today’s
technological realities with no room for growth. Digital libertarians
fail to explain why legislation would have to be inflexible and uni-
form. The argument also assumes that the private sector is not subject
to the same traps of rapidly obsolescing technology and failure of
creative vision to which the government supposedly is prey.70 “The
legislative process may (indeed must) be imperfect but it does not
follow that the market is always preferable.”71
B. Locality in Cyberspace: Do You Know the Way to
www.sanjose.com?
Many legal critiques of state-based regulations focus on the
problems of geography in cyberspace.72 As we saw in the first part, the
Internet’s “indifference to geographic position”73 creates problems for
legal systems that rely heavily on physical location to establish juris-
diction. The Internet is designed to look for logical addresses, domain
names, which have no direct relation to the location of a particular
server. Although some domain name addresses give clues about loca-
tion (www.law.duke.edu, for example, may be assumed to belong to
Duke University School of Law, which is located in Durham, North
Carolina), many make no reference to geography. Moreover, a site
68. See infra notes 145-66 and accompanying text.
69. See infra note 154 and accompanying text (referring to a divide between “have-nots and
have-laters”).
70. An example is the way that corporations, including Microsoft, failed for years to “get”
the Internet before scrambling to catch up once sites like Amazon.com and e-Bay proved that
there was a consumer market on the Internet.
71. Cohen, supra note 12, at 491. She goes on, “An equally important lesson . . . is that all
real world institutions, including markets, are imperfect.” Id. This is an obvious point, however.
It is markets, not legislation, that are premised on the concept of perfection. Democratic proc-
esses do not claim to smell sweet or bloom in spring.
72. David Post and David Johnson’s article, Law and Borders, articulated this critique
early in the development of cyberlaw. See generally Johnson & Post, supra note 9. Although the
focus of their analysis has changed somewhat, it is always founded on the absence of geographi-
cal and physical constraints in cyberspace. See David G. Post & David R. Johnson, “Chaos Pre-
vailing on Every Continent”: Towards a New Theory of Decentralized Decision-Making in Com-
plex Systems, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1055, 1057 (1998) (making an argument for organic
regulation based on complex-systems theory).
73. Burk, supra note 9, at 1109.
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with a name like www.I-love-NYC.com could actually be coming
from a server in New Jersey, Delaware, or Saudi Arabia.74 Not only
would a user not know this information, the user would not care be-
cause the information would arrive in exactly the same form regard-
less of geography. The network is designed to be indifferent to geog-
raphy.
The problem with borders has a descriptive side, which raises
questions about feasibility and efficacy of regulation, and a normative
side, which focuses on the legitimacy of state-based regulations of cy-
berspace.75 On the descriptive side, it is argued that any nation that
wishes to participate in the digital age will not be able to prevent the
flow of electronic information.76 Some nations may attempt to control
the flow of electrons, but “the determined seeker of prohibited com-
munications can simply reconfigure his connection so as to appear to
reside in a location outside the particular locality, state, or country.”77
Moreover, the digital libertarians query, how will nations determine
whose rules apply when, as will be common, a transaction crosses one
or more borders?
Even if there were a way to sort out what law applies, to detect
crimes, and to locate the offender, libertarians insist that imposing the
order of any sovereign nation on cyberspace would be illegitimate for
two reasons: notice and consent. One of the functions of borders is to
notify new residents that they are entering a new physical and legal
space with new rules. Because in cyberspace one can cross national
boundaries without direct knowledge or control of the passage into a
new national territory, one will not have the essential due process
right to notice of the territorial laws in force.78 In addition to notice,
digital libertarians worry about what Jack Goldsmith calls “spillover
effects.”79 This is the fear that one nation will effectively impose its
74. Id. at 1371.
75. Goldsmith, supra note 11, at 1200.
76. Johnson & Post, supra note 9, at 1372.
77. Id. at 1374.
78. Id. (arguing that protective schemes will fail if based on the notion that a webpage be-
ing accessed by a local resident can subject activity that occurs on a foreign webpage to local
regulation).
79. Goldsmith, supra note 11, at 1212. Although I am using the term “spillover” here to
refer to negative externalities or harms to third parties, there is nothing inherently negative
about spillover. In fact, Professors Post and Johnson have written about the importance of spill-
over between different rule regimes in moving towards optimal systems. Post & Johnson, supra
note 72, at 1085 (“[A] system in which “neighbors” (in the geographical sense) are most likely to
affect the welfare of each other than they are to affect the welfare of those less physically
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laws on all of cyberspace by attempting to prosecute the owners of
websites that violate that country’s laws, regardless of whether the
website or its authors are citizens of that particular nation. Under this
scenario, “[a]ll such Web-based activity [would be] . . . subject simul-
taneously to the laws of all territorial sovereigns.”80
An infamous example is the conflict between Germany and
CompuServe in 1995. Germany threatened to prosecute CompuServe
for carrying discussion groups that violated its antipornography laws.81
When CompuServe attempted to block access to those sites to Ger-
man users, it effectively blocked access to users worldwide,82 con-
firming the worst fears of those who oppose regulation: one country’s
standards became the censorship standard for the world. According
to the digital libertarians, imposing national laws on noncitizens is il-
legitimate, because the foreign user does not have a voice in the sov-
ereign’s lawmaking process. State-based regulation of cyberspace is
therefore said to be fundamentally antidemocratic.
C. Response to the Critics
Critics of regulation emphasize the technical and doctrinal prob-
lems presented by the application of a traditional nation-based regu-
latory system to behavior that occurs “in” cyberspace. At the same
time, these critics downplay the harms produced by failure to regu-
late. The claim that governments are powerless against cyberspace
crime (unless the government removes itself from the global market
by shutting down the whole pipe)83 is based on an absolutist concep-
tion of regulation. Cyberspace is more material than critics of regula-
tion admit. There are many ways for a nation legitimately to reduce
behavior it has determined to be harmful: by imposing screening obli-
gations on in-state Internet service providers (ISPs), by regulating in-
state hardware, or by regulating financial intermediaries.84 As the lib-
ertarians observe, these pressures will not be perfectly effective:
“[T]he determined seeker of prohibited communications can simply
proximate . . . will produce largely congruent decision-making units, allowing more effective
searching for the system-wide optima.”).
80. Johnson & Post, supra note 9, at 1374.
81. Goldsmith, supra note 11, at 1222.
82. Id. at 1224.
83. See Johnson & Post, supra note 9, at 1370 (noting that states that wish to control infor-
mation flows risk being left out of the global electronic market).
84. Goldsmith, supra note 11, at 1224-28.
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reconfigure his connection.”85 However, the less-determined seeker
might find something else to do, which, if one believes that some indi-
vidual behaviors are socially harmful enough to warrant regulation by
the state, is a gain. The function of regulation is to decrease incidents
of socially harmful behavior.86 The goal may be to end the behavior,
but we would have few laws on the books if we eliminated any law
that fails to wipe out all the behavior it targets.87
The law also can be useful in stimulating private industry to pro-
duce its own solutions.88 In the case of the Internet, many of these pri-
vate “fixes” to public policy problems have been technical solutions
such as filters to block problematic content, or other methods of lim-
iting access to certain groups. When Germany pressured CompuServe
to block pornography from popular chat sites, the company began in-
vestigating ways to create new technology that would allow it to block
access selectively.89 In fact, the technology exists to filter information
flows in many ways. Pornographic content sites use a variety of
means, including passwords and credit card requirements, to prevent
underage users from accessing the site. Critics of regulation vastly
overstate the difficulty of limiting one’s electronic communications,
either geographically or to particular categories of users such as chil-
dren, through the use of filters.90
Another example of the productive effect of government inter-
vention is the Federal Trade Commission’s investigation of website
privacy policies.91 The FTC found that many sites were selling their
users’ information without their consent or knowledge.92 Congress
authorized the FTC to implement a policy to improve privacy on-
85. Johnson & Post, supra note 9, at 1372.
86. Goldsmith, supra note 11, at 1238.
87. “[R]egulation need not be perfect in [the sense of eliminating regulation evasion] to be
effective.” Id. at 1223.
88. Environmental laws have demonstrated that government can stimulate new market
demands. This is overlooked by critics who claim that the effect of laws only inhibits creative
development.
89. Id. at 1225.
90. Id. at 1229. Technological solutions can never be more than one piece of the govern-
ance puzzle. For an excellent discussion of the dangers of relying on technological solutions, see
generally Boyle, supra note 12.
91. Federal Trade Commission, Privacy Online: A Report to Congress, at http://www.ftc.
gov/reports/privacy3/toc.htm (June 1998) (on file with the Duke Law Journal).
92. Id.
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line.93 The Commission invited private industry to participate in cre-
ating solutions, and, within a couple of years, many more websites
provided users with published privacy policies (although the FTC ul-
timately determined that self-regulation alone was insufficient to en-
sure consumer privacy).94 Private industry advocates who tout this
kind of example as evidence of industry solving its own problems
conveniently forget that it was the pressure of government interven-
tion that produced the corporate commitment to protecting consumer
privacy.
The jurisdictional argument made by libertarians relies on an
outmoded nineteenth-century conception of jurisdiction that was
made obsolete by commerce and industrialism.95 Today, according to
American and widely accepted international law, behavior of foreign
entities that has a harmful effect on a citizen of another state can be
prosecuted legitimately (as long as that entity has had “minimum con-
tacts” within the sovereign’s borders).96 Under modern jurisprudence,
an array of choice-of-law regimes exists to help sovereigns regulate
actions of foreign entities. The spillover feared by critics of cyber-
regulation is not a new problem produced by the Internet but, as
Goldsmith notes, “a commonplace consequence . . . in our increas-
ingly interconnected world.”97
D. Self-Ordering in Cyberspace
Digital libertarians claim that cyberspace does not require regu-
lation by states because, left to its own devices, cyberspace is capable
93. FTC Seeks Measure to Protect Privacy on Web, WALL ST. J., May 23, 2000, at A4; FTC
to Suggest Privacy Guidelines to Govern Internet, WALL ST. J., July 21, 1998, at B17; Online Ad-
vertisers are Negotiating Deal on Privacy Rules with U.S. Regulators, WALL ST. J., June 13, 2000,
at A8.
94. Gwendolyn Mariano, FTC to Recommend Stronger Privacy Legislation to Congress,
CNET NEWS, at http://news.cnet.com/news/0-1005-202-1926088.html (May 22, 2000) (on file
with the Duke Law Journal).
95. Goldsmith, supra note 11, at 1205.
96. Id. at 1207 (describing the twentieth-century shift towards less rigid jurisdictional bor-
ders both in interstate and international law).
97. Goldsmith, supra note 11, at 1212. It should be a source of some comfort to those who
fear overregulation of the Internet that “minimum contacts” still are required. In the current
state of technology, it is highly doubtful that merely having a website that is accessible in a par-
ticular jurisdiction would form the basis for personal jurisdiction. But if the technology develops
to make it possible to control accessibility, then perhaps that might change. Although there are
valid reasons to protect against the potential chilling effect on the development of this new me-
dium due to uncertain legal liability, at the same time there remain real third-party harms that
must be addressed.
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of self-ordering. Through informal interactions and contractual ar-
rangements between parties, the libertarians argue, a form of sponta-
neous law will develop. In fact, some point out that this self-ordering
law has already begun in cyberspace. It is called “netiquette.”98 Ac-
cording to the libertarian view, cyberspace is amenable to self-
regulation for several reasons: First, greater access to information
levels the playing field between consumers and sellers and, therefore,
promotes fair, arms-length bargaining. Second, normally prohibitive
transaction costs that prevent parties from reaching mutually benefi-
cial private agreements—including distance, lack of information, and
the cost of negotiations—are reduced or eliminated by digital com-
munication. Finally, cyberspace lets users choose between websites
and Internet service providers based on their rules and practices and,
if the users cannot find a site with policies they like, they can establish
their own. In economic terms, cyberspace reduces the costs of exit
and entry.
The chief advantage of a self-ordering system for libertarians is
that it is noncoercive: all parties choose to accept the conditions of
the agreement. Any reduction in the individual’s perfect liberty is ac-
cepted voluntarily and, presumably, only because the benefits to the
parties exceed the costs. Moreover, self-ordering systems are seen as
reflecting a natural order, because they arise spontaneously rather
than through a planned set of policy objectives. Harboring a distinct
mistrust of plans, and possessing a correspondingly high level of trust
that unplanned systems will naturally move towards harmonious bal-
ance, libertarians prefer the invisible hand to any elected decision-
maker.99
The self-ordering system par excellence is the free market. In the
free market, all resources are said to be naturally channeled to the
highest-valuing consumer through the effects of competition and ra-
tional profit-maximizing choices.100 The free market has two advan-
tages: first, it allocates resources efficiently and, second, it achieves
this efficiency by allowing a natural order (expressed through rational
profit-maximizing behavior) to reign and by eliminating the distrac-
tion of emotional or political preferences. Classical economic theory
98. Johnson, supra note 60.
99. E.g., Post, supra note 10, at 1454 (“We don’t need a ‘plan’ but a multitude of plans from
among which individuals can choose, and ‘the market’ and not action by the global collective, is
most likely to bring that plentitude to us.”).
100. NICHOLAS MERCURO & STEVEN G. MEDEMA, ECONOMICS AND THE LAW: FROM
POSNER TO POST-MODERNISM 57 (1997).
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dreams of a “perfect market,” an ideal allocation of resources to their
most efficient owners through perfect competition.101 But such a mar-
ket exists only in theory.102 In the real world, markets are plagued by
market failures. Different economic theories describe these failures
differently. For traditional microeconomics, there are several types of
market failures: monopolies, asymmetrical information, and public
goods.103 Public goods also are known as “positive externalities”: ac-
tivities that generate a benefit that cannot be internalized (such as the
national defense or the cleaning of a public space). The reverse of
positive externalities, negative externalities, occur when one’s activity
imposes costs on others (such as pollution). Within a Coasian
model,104 all market failures are understood under the broad rubric of
“transaction costs,” be they the cost of gathering information or the
costs of negotiating a deal.105
Digital communication appears to reduce significantly traditional
market imperfections by offering nearly costless transactions and by
placing greater information at the user’s fingertips. Take the example
of e-Bay. By creating a global garage sale, the Internet allows one
person to sell what she considers clutter to another person who con-
siders it collectible. Goods move to their highest-value user. To use
another example, it may not be cost effective for a person to travel
across the city comparing prices before making a small purchase, but
101. See id. at 59 (describing Pareto efficiency and Kaldor-Hicks efficiency, the standard
definition of efficiency within the Chicago law-and-economics approach); see also Niva Elkin-
Koren & Eli M. Salzberger, Law and Economics in Cyberspace, 19 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 553,
555 (1999) (“The fundamental tenet of the Chicago approach is that competition within a per-
fect market will lead to efficiency, which is the desirable normative goal of the legal system.”).
102. Elkin-Koren & Salzberger, supra note 101, at 577 (“Economic analysis, unlike natural
science, does not even pretend to analyze the real world. It seeks to analyze a simplified
world.”).
103. Consider Elkin-Koren and Salzberger’s description:
Central intervention within the market is justified, according to the Chicago analysis,
only when there is a market failure. Such a failure exists when there are no multiple
players on both sides of the market . . . when these players do not have symmetric and
full information relevant to their market activities . . . or when the traded commodity
is a public good.
Id. at 555.
104. See Ronald Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 44 (1960) (“If factors
of production are thought of as rights, it becomes easier to understand that the right to do some-
thing which has a harmful effect (such as the creation of smoke, noise, smells, etc.) is also a fac-
tor of production.”).
105. See Elkin-Koren & Salzberger, supra note 101, at 567 (summarizing transaction cost
analysis as a school of law and economics and describing transaction costs as overlapping with
other market failures, especially externalities and lack of information).
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on the Internet a person can direct her shopping “bot” to find pre-
cisely the item she wants at a price she is willing to pay.
From a law-and-economics standpoint, therefore, the reduction
in externalities in cyberspace justifies the reduction in state interven-
tion. According to the influential microeconomics-based Chicago
school of law and economics, the purpose of law and government is to
correct market failures, thus allowing all goods to be distributed effi-
ciently to their highest value user.106 Legal rules, in other words, es-
tablish prices for behavior when the market, for some reason, cannot.
When the market fails, legislation or courts are supposed to produce
the results the parties would themselves have reached through private
agreements in the market but for externalities.107
The Internet seems not only to make the traditional economy
function more efficiently but also, by bringing producers and consum-
ers together, to offer an even more perfect form of free-market ex-
change.108 In the digital age, economies of scale are replaced by indi-
vidualized production.109 For example, a person can customize a
standard webpage like Yahoo to create “My Yahoo,” which only dis-
plays the information she wants. In a mass-production economy, de-
sires must be shaped to be similar. In other words, we all are ordering
from the prix fixe menu. Cyberspace lets everyone into the kitchen to
cook whatever they want. This ability to serve individual rather than
group desires goes by several names, such as “granularization” or
“demassification.”110
106. See MERCURO & MEDEMA, supra note 100, at 57.
107. Market theory defines an externality as anything that causes a market to fail to reach
pareto optimalism. Although most strong free-market proponents see minimum wage, antidis-
crimination, and consumer protection laws as unnatural interference in the free market (or even
an unconstitutional invasion of property rights), in the post-Lochner era one might defend such
government programs as corrections of market failures.
108. This implies, interestingly, that the “perfect” market of pre-digital times was not per-
fect. People were not expressing their true natural desires, but instead were having their round
desires forced into square holes. Because the preference model is relied upon in the self-
ordering system, it should be somewhat alarming to free market boosters that the old system
was not actually doing what was claimed for decades.
109. See Dyson et al., supra note 19 (“Inexpensive knowledge destroys economies-of-
scale.”). Other theorists have expressed more concern over the balkanization potential which
Andrew Shapiro calls “oversteer.” ANDREW SHAPIRO, THE CONTROL REVOLUTION 104
(1999).
110. Dyson et al., supra note 19 (using the term “demassification”). However, it may be that
granularization completely ignores such effects as the pleasure one gets from owning the same
Britney Spears compact disc as all of one’s friends—the peer pressure network effect.
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Proponents of demassification, however, promise much more
than just improved shopping:111 “Accelerating demassification creates
the potential for vastly increased human freedom.”112 But what does
this mean? How does the breakdown of economies-of-scale to “just-
in-time production” contribute to human freedom? One way to un-
derstand the connection is to see the Internet as producing a more
competitive market in rule regimes just as it supplies smaller niches in
consumer demand. In the real world, living in a civil society requires
each one of us to relinquish some of our individual liberty. Applying a
classical economic framework to the social contract, one might posit
that each citizen gives up only the amount of freedom required to ob-
tain the requisite benefits of social living. As with the market for con-
sumer goods, an individual does have some choice between different
rule regimes. I can choose to live in Salt Lake City, or to live in the
Castro district of San Francisco, or to live in Amsterdam, and each
will offer me different communities with different rules. However,
there are obvious market failures that are going to force the individ-
ual into inefficient regimes in which one gives up more (or less) free-
dom than one gains in civil values.
Extremely high costs of entry and exit give territorial govern-
ments a form of monopoly within the “market” of regulatory regimes.
The entrance problem is produced by the limited number of states
and the nearly impassable barriers to creating one’s own state if none
of the available alternatives suffices. Barriers to exit are a much
greater problem. Most people will not leave their nation because they
do not like the laws until the laws become extremely oppressive.
Thus, in the physical world there is not a very effective market in
regulations.
Here, again, cyberspace appears to reduce market failure signifi-
cantly by enabling the development of a market in rule regimes.113 In
one version of this market in rule regimes, different rules will arise at
111. Demassification, or customization, has several implications. First, it turns out to be an
argument against the need for some property laws, particularly intellectual property laws. When
all property is custom-made, the need for the state to protect ownership decreases. John Bar-
low’s version of this argument is that creators of intellectual property will be paid the same way
as (if not as well as) lawyers or doctors: based on a service or performance model rather than a
static property model. Barlow, supra note 7.
112. Dyson et al., supra note 19 (emphasis added).
113. Some dispute this claim of easy exit. E.g., Netanel, supra note 12, at 426 (noting that
under some circumstances “exit is far from costless”). See generally LESSIG, supra note 12 (dis-
puting the claim that cyberspace cannot be regulated effectively).
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different sites, and users will choose sites based on their individual
rule preferences. The rules will be promulgated and enforced by each
Internet service provider’s systems operator (or “sysop”), who dis-
penses passwords and manages the site.114 These sysops are the natu-
ral enforcers of cyberspace law because they have the power to con-
trol access. Sysops are able to set the specific policy of a particular site
and require users to abide by the site’s policies. In fact, most ISPs al-
ready have “Authorized Use Policies” which ban certain Internet be-
havior like spamming115 and flaming.116 But the development of laws in
cyberspace is not envisioned as a one-way street with sysops imposing
behaviors on users. The tremendous variety of sites available on the
Internet and the ease of both exit (to other sites) and entry (the abil-
ity to launch cheaply your own website) is supposed to shift the power
to determine desirable policies to the user. If sysops try to enforce
unpopular policies, users will find, or create, more hospitable sites.
The beauty of this system, according to its proponents, is that it
eliminates the need for agreement on a single solution. There is no
more choosing from national legal systems the way consumers are
forced to choose from the limited range of consumer products forced
upon them by mass production. For example, one of the major points
of conflict on the Internet thus far has been the debate about offen-
sive language and defamation.117 According to proponents of the self-
regulation model, systems operators will establish rules about accept-
able content. A variety of less and more restrictive sites will eventu-
ally develop to serve the different groups.118 There will be a site for
those who are willing to accept a higher degree of offensive language
in exchange for the freedom to say and hear almost anything. There
will be another with a more restrictive code of conduct for those who
are willing to relinquish some freedom to avoid encountering what of-
fends them.119 Similarly, in the arena of copyright there will be sites
114. Johnson & Post, supra note 9, at 1389 (“System operators (sysops) have an extremely
powerful enforcement tool at their disposal to enforce such rules—banishment.”).
115. Unauthorized commercial e-mail.
116. Electronically communicated insults.
117. See David R. Johnson & David G. Post, The New “Civic Virtue” of the Internet, in INST.
FOR INFO. STUDIES, THE EMERGING INTERNET 23, 44-45 (1998) (describing the problem of on-
line defamation).
118. Id. at 44 (“The problem of online defamation . . . might be dealt with more successfully
by a decentralized, emergent model of law-making.”).
119. Consider Johnson and Post’s statement:
Assume that various people have thinner or thicker skins and worry to a greater or
lesser degree about the free flow of robust discussion. Some will favor online areas
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that are known for taking a liberal attitude. By posting to such a site
the user would be considered to have “consented” to having her work
freely used. Another site will be available for those who wish to pro-
tect their work, and users of that site will understand that copying
work posted there violates the site’s rules and could result in banish-
ment from the site.120
The self-ordering model seems to solve all the problems associ-
ated with state regulation: centralization, uniformity, lack of legiti-
macy, and absence of notice. A self-ordered Internet would be re-
sponsive to the unique nature of the medium, because it would arise
organically at the hands of Internet users, those “who care most
deeply about this new digital trade in ideas, information and serv-
ices.”121 Users and systems operators would create rules through
“principled discussions” and “a collective conversation about online
participants core values.”122 Most importantly, a self-ordered Internet
would be more democratic because its laws would be selected and
endorsed by those who are subject to them. The consent of the gov-
erned, however, requires that the effects of online behavior stay
within the boundaries of cyberspace. In other words, the self-
regulation model of cyberspace requires a conception of cyberspace
divorced from the real world.
III.  A PLACE CALLED CYBERSPACE
A. Spillover
Digital libertarians strongly press their own concerns about spill-
over. They argue that one nation’s regulation of cyberspace will in-
variably affect the entire global digital sphere. Examples of this kind
of spillover include the CompuServe controversy cited earlier123 and
the early efforts of states to apply their own pornography laws or
that strictly limit apparently unreliable and derogatory comments. Some will favor ar-
eas that make no attempt to regulate false and damaging comments.
Id.
120. This system requires a well informed citizenry, and there is currently no method by
which to insure that this information is well-distributed. While acknowledging this limitation, it
does not appear to be considered a significant obstacle by the cyber-lawmakers.
121. Johnson & Post, supra note 9, at 1367.
122. Id.
123. See supra notes 81-82 and accompanying text.
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antigambling laws against sites accessed by their citizens.124 Critics of
state-based regulations express great concern for spillover effects
flowing into cyberspace but express far less concern for the costs of
spillover effects flowing out of cyberspace.125 Even if we acknowledge
that regulation of cyberspace by one nation will have some impact on
users within other jurisdictions, this claim does not absolve critics
from the need to answer their own question in a reversed form:
Should a sovereign like Germany or Minnesota be required to permit
and absorb the costs of my freedom to download dirty pictures or
gamble online?126 Digital libertarians claim that Net users should not
be subject to the laws of a government that does not represent or rec-
ognize their preferences. But the argument can be turned around. To
the extent that there is spillover from online activity (harms in the
real world, such as invasions of privacy, consumer fraud, copyright in-
fringement, or the social costs of addictive gambling), the self-order
created by Internet users illegitimately imposes costs on nonusers.
Unless libertarians can address the problem of offline spillover—their
own argument against regulation—they risk hypocrisy. Of course,
some libertarian purists do not consider offline spillover to be a
problem, because they do not consider regulation useful in any space,
real or virtual. To remove cyberspace from the libertarian argument,
however, undercuts a central claim made by digital libertarians—that
cyberspace is uniquely suited to self-regulation: “Global computer
based communications . . . create[] a new realm of human activity. . . .
[and] define[] a distinct cyberspace that needs and can create its own
law and legal institutions.”127 If digital libertarians do not evade the
problem of spillover by prescribing self-regulation as a model for the
offline world, what solutions do they offer?
The libertarians’ response to the spillover problem is twofold. It
places the problem outside of the system and minimizes its impor-
tance. Post and Johnson repeatedly insist that their system is only in-
124. Johnson & Post, supra note 9, at 1374 (noting that the Minnesota Attorney General has
asserted the right to regulate gambling on foreign web pages which local residents have ac-
cessed).
125. Goldsmith, supra note 11, at 1242.
126. Goldsmith has noted that:
Fairness does not require Germany to yield local control over its territory in order to
accommodate the users of a new communication technology in other countries. Nor
does it require Germany to absorb the local costs of foreign activity because of the
costs that the German regulation might impose on such activity.
Id. at 1242.
127. Johnson & Post, supra note 9, at 1367.
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tended to apply “to online conduct that principally affects others en-
gaged in online commerce and communities.”128 This insistence, how-
ever, begs the question. It presumes that the effects of online conduct
will, in large part, remain in cyberspace. In the end, Post and Johnson
are stuck with spillover and can only insist that the problem is “less
important than the impact of the rules on those who choose to par-
ticipate.”129 This response is unsatisfactory. If it turns out that the im-
pact is greater than anticipated, does that mean that we return to the
much-maligned state regulation? Or, are cyberlibertarians actually
recommending a tradeoff between the benefits of remaining regula-
tion-free and the costs of new or increased social problems introduced
by an unregulated cyberspace? If the latter, we need to consider the
nature of this exchange and who its main beneficiaries (and losers)
will be.
I would argue that it is no accident that digital libertarianism
cannot solve the spillover conundrum. Indeed, it is only when one be-
gins to consider the implications of spillover that one gets close to
what is most radical, and problematic, with digital libertarianism. The
dilemma of spillover is a question about where cyberspace “is,” where
we are when we are “there,” and, ultimately, who we are when we are
“there.” This story begins not in the 1960s with the ARPANET, but
in the 1780s with the United States Constitution.
B. The Constitutional Self in Cyberspace
In Private Property and the Limits of American Constitutional-
ism, Jennifer Nedelsky offers a counternarrative about the develop-
ment of the American property-based notion of liberty.130 Nedelsky’s
story is extremely helpful for understanding the current enthusiasm
for private-ordering of the Internet. In brief, the story goes like this.
In the early days of the Republic, the fragile post-Revolutionary con-
sensus began to fray due to conflicting interests (both between the
states and between groups of citizens).131 In particular, a struggle de-
128. Johnson & Post, supra note 117, at 24. But see Hardy, supra note 9, at 1048-51 (sug-
gesting that anonymous mailers are not susceptible to self-help or contract-based solutions and
should be banned).
129. Johnson & Post, supra note 117, at 41.
130. JENNIFER NEDELSKY, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE LIMITS OF AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONALISM 1 (1990) (“The framework of our political institutions and the categories
through which we understand politics developed around the problems of making popular gov-
ernment compatible with the security of property.”).
131. Id. at 4 (describing a conflict between property owners and others).
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veloped between the minority population of property owners and the
popularly elected lawmakers, who enthusiastically adopted anti-
property statutes such as debtor-relief bills and paper-currency legis-
lation.132
The resolution of private property rights was a critical issue for
the young nation. Such economic issues and their impact on the con-
federation’s capacity for commerce and international relations were
the catalysts for the Constitutional Convention.133 Nedelsky argues,
however, that the Framers erred gravely by treating private property
rights as a metaphor for the protection of rights more broadly: “The
inherent vulnerability of all individual rights became transformed into
a fear of ‘the people’ as a threatening propertyless mass whose power
must be contained.”134 The materiality of land gave the abstract notion
of limited government a spacialized and concrete symbol. “Property
was the ideal symbol for this vision of autonomy, for it could both lit-
erally and figuratively provide the necessary walls.”135 The analogy of
human autonomy to private property shaped the American concep-
tion of the individual as perpetually under attack by the majority (due
to the unequal distribution of property which Madison saw as inevita-
ble within a free society).136 Moreover, the property-rights conception
of individual freedom confuses freedom with isolation. At the ex-
treme, “the most perfectly autonomous man is the most perfectly
isolated.”137
Property concretizes the abstract concept of limited government.
This here is the sphere into which the government may not interfere.
Property rights, and, by extension, all individual rights, were under-
stood, through the use of the natural metaphor of land, as themselves
natural and prior to the state. Although the organic, pre-state concep-
tion of property rights has long been replaced by the legal realist no-
tion of property as a bundle of rights negotiated between the collec-
tive (the state) and the individual, the natural model of property
rights proves a hard faith to shake, as the revived discourse of private-
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 2.
135. Id. at 272.
136. Id. at 18 (quoting Madison as saying that “in all populous countries, the smaller part
only can be interested in the rights of property”). Madison fully anticipated the resentment
property would produce, as an increasing portion of the population would “labor under all the
hardships of life, and secretly sigh for a more equal distribution of its blessings.” Id.
137. Id. at 272.
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ordering illustrates.138 I argue that the property myth remains vital at
least in part because it undergirds a more fundamental notion of self-
hood. If property is just a bundle of rights, what does that mean for
the conception of the autonomous self as symbolized by property?
Are we too just bundles of entitlements granted by the state? Are we
engendered by the collective? By the real? If so, what prevents the
state from redefining individual rights in the same way nuisance law
redefines property rights? The presumed antagonism between the
state and the individual required a limiting mechanism. But if the
metaphor of property is understood as a politically and historically
determined construct, its function as a symbolic limiting mechanism is
undercut. Our traditional conception of individual autonomy as
threatened by the collective provides no method, and no narrative,
with which to negotiate a new, safe relationship. The flight back to
the pre-realist conception of property through the dematerialism of
cyberspace is, I suggest, a response to this anxiety about safety of the
self.139
C. Privilege and Prejudice in Cyberspace
Who are we in cyberspace? In a classic New Yorker cartoon, a
dog sits grinning at a computer terminal and the caption reads, “In
cyberspace, no one knows you’re a dog.” The joke captures what is
uniquely liberating about going online, the opportunity to be some-
one else, or to be multiple someone elses.140 It is this freedom that
John Perry Barlow celebrates when he describes cyberspace as a
place without “privilege or prejudice.”141 Privilege and prejudice are
envisioned as problems of the material world; there can be no dis-
crimination without bodies.142 Interestingly, Barlow’s “no privilege or
138. See Cohen, supra note 12, at 464 (describing “a growing body of argument and scholar-
ship concerning the relative superiority (as compared with copyright) of common law property
and contract rules for protecting and disseminating digital works”).
139. For an excellent discussion of how anxiety shapes politics and jurisprudence, see
PRISCILLA WALD, CONSTITUTING AMERICANS 4 (1995) (discussing the “anxiety surrounding
the conceptualization of personhood” in American literary and political culture).
140. LESSIG, supra note 12, at 67 (describing how America Online gives each subscriber five
identities).
141. Barlow, supra note 3.
142. The problem with this ideal of equality through the escape of bodies is that it relies on a
concept of self without raced, gendered, or otherwise inflected identity. As many critical race
theorists have observed, colorblindness is problematic because it unconsciously assumes white
(and male) to be the default. See, e.g., Margaret Chon, Erasing Race?: A Critical Race Feminist
View of Internet Identity-Shifting, 3 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 439, 441-42 (2000) (describing
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prejudice” is a progressive mirror image of the neoclassical claim that
cyberspace eliminates transaction costs. Recall that, according to law
and economics, the reason for laws is to solve imperfections in the
market. In a post-Lochner age it can reasonably be said that Ameri-
can courts treat social factors—“privilege and prejudice”—as hin-
drances to the equal bargaining power required for a functioning
competitive market. Barlow’s phrase, “privilege and prejudice,” in
other words, is a remarkably compressed expression of the justifica-
tion for a large percentage of the laws passed within the second half
of the twentieth century. Through legislation such as labor laws and
civil rights laws, the government seeks to ease privilege and prejudice
and, moreover, to protect its victims from further injustices at the
hands of a market economy. In the brick-and-mortar world, it is gen-
erally accepted that laws are needed to adjust for a lumpy playing
field, a field cratered by material conditions like economic status,
prejudice, and lack of education, for which laws attempt to compen-
sate. The question is whether it is correct to assume that the absence
of material presence on the Internet (“There is no matter here.”)143 in
fact produces the absence of material conditions to which the market
theory aspires.
An idealist conception of cyberspace rooted in a particular con-
ception of the individual is what I understand Post and Johnson to ar-
ticulate in their imperative, “[T]ake cyberspace seriously.”144 The lib-
ertarian vision of cyberspace in fact requires that spillover not be
considered a problem, because spillover, conceived of broadly as the
interrelation between the physical and digital worlds, defeats the es-
capist fantasy. The desire to escape the messiness of real life, which
on the Internet seems possible, is at the heart of the libertarian hope.
But, as I will discuss in the final Part, spillover undercuts the cyber-
space escapist dream.
how virtual race is coded as white and claiming that the “movement into virtual Whiteness is not
one that lifts everyone up, but rather one that subtly obscures the enduring nature of material
racial categories”).
143. Barlow, supra note 3.
144. Johnson & Post, supra note 9, at 1381 (“Once we take Cyberspace seriously as a dis-
tinct place for purposes of legal analysis, many opportunities to clarify and simplify the rules
applicable to online transactions become available.”).
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IV.  EVERYWHERE AND NOWHERE
The belief that cyberspace produces an absence of material con-
ditions (geography, gender, and race, to list just a few) is implicit in
the oft-repeated claim that cyberspace is “everywhere and no-
where.”145 There is a sense in which “everywhere and nowhere” is an
accurate description of one’s experience in cyberspace. But the
statement also tells us something about the privileged social position
of the speaker. Cyberspace, in fact, is not everywhere. According to a
Department of Commerce study, less than one in ten households with
incomes under $20,000 has Internet access (compared to 60% of
households earning $75,000 or more).146 In the United States, the so-
called “digital divide” can be measured along income, racial, and edu-
cational lines, as well as between urban and rural populations.147
There is also an enormous international gap in access to new commu-
nications media. In South Asia, one person in 10,000 uses the Inter-
net.148 Countries like Pakistan and Yemen have fewer than two tele-
phone lines per hundred citizens.149 And the World Bank estimates
that developing countries will require $60 billion to develop their
telecommunications networks.150 Despite its largely laissez-faire ap-
proach to technology, the Clinton administration in 1999 took an ac-
tive role in addressing the issue of uneven access. At the behest of
President Clinton, the Commerce Department held a Digital Divide
145. Id. at 1376 (“[E]vents on the Net occur everywhere but nowhere in particular . . . .”).
146. Kevin Poulsen, Summit Wrestles with ‘Digital Divide’, ZDNET NEWS FROM ZD WIRE,
Dec. 9, 1999, available at 1999 WL 14538439.
147. The latest report from the National Telecommunications and Information Administra-
tion, Falling Through the Net: Toward Digital Inclusion, at http://www.ntia.doc.gov/ntiahome/
fttn00/contents00.html (last visited Apr. 8, 2001) (on file with the Duke Law Journal) [hereinaf-
ter Falling Through the Net], shows progress in access generally. For example, Internet access
among households earning $35,000-49,000 increased from 29% in December 1998 to 46.1% in
August 2000. Id. Black household access rose from 11.2% to 23.5%. Id. Hispanic households
experienced a similar growth. Id. But, significantly, the report also found that the gap between
black households and the national average rate had increased over the past two years by 3%,
and the gap between Hispanic households and the national average rate increased by 4.3%
points. Id.; see also Closing the Digital Divide, at http://www.digitaldivide.gov (last visited Apr.
19, 2001) (providing more information concering the digital divide) (on file with the Duke Law
Journal). Margaret Chon has observed that “[r]acial discrimination occurs when we reinforce
and reinscribe the banality of social inequities that fall along racial fault lines.” Chon, supra note
142, at 451.
148. Tom Steinert-Threlkeld, Some Are More Equal than Others, ZDNET INTER@CTIVE
WEEK ONLINE (Nov. 29, 1999), available at 1999 WL 14629317.
149. Id.
150. Id.
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Summit to address the problem through a government–private sector
partnership.151 President Clinton also directed the Commerce De-
partment to continue “to measure the level of connectivity of Ameri-
cans to telecommunications and information tools.”152 By contrast, in
its first one hundred days, the George W. Bush administration pro-
posed reducing government programs that provide computers and
Internet access to poor and underserved areas of the country.153 Liber-
tarians view government intervention as a misguided failure of faith
in competitive markets to bring down prices and increase access, a
form of bleeding-heart impatience. According to Louis Rosetto, the
founder of Wired magazine, the digital divide is not a question of
haves and have-nots but haves and have-laters.154 As an empirical
question, whether competition alone is the best method of improving
access is hard to answer.155 But for the purposes of this analysis, the
“digital divide” illustrates the significance of material conditions in
and on virtual space. Social inequalities in the offline world shape the
Internet while, at the same time, the Internet may intensify already
existing social divisions.
A more chilling example is offered in an essay by Margaret
Chon.156 She describes a discussion in a “gender and cyberspace” class
about Jake Baker, the University of Michigan student who was ar-
151. Poulsen, supra note 146.
152. William J. Clinton, Memorandum on Narrowing the Digital Divide, 35 WKLY.
COMPILATION PRESIDENTIAL DOCUMENTS 2554 (1999).
153. The George W. Bush administration’s Commerce Department budget proposal sug-
gests cutting the Technology Opportunities Program from $42.5 million to $15 million—a 65%
reduction. Ted Bridis, Programs Set Up to Help Close ‘Digital Divide’ May Be Cut Back, WALL
ST. J., Feb. 15, 2001, at A20. Meanwhile, Michael Powell, the new chairman of the Federal
Communications Commission, illustrated his attitude towards government intervention by
analogizing the digital divide to a Mercedes divide. “‘I think there is a Mercedes divide,’ he said.
‘I’d like to have one; I can’t afford one.’” Stephen Labaton, New F.C.C. Chief Would Curb
Agency Reach, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 7, 2001, at C1.
154. Rosetto, supra note 59. Rosetto, in fact, sees wealthy consumers as martyrs, “people . . .
who pay through the nose for the privilege of being beta testers, getting inferior technology at
inflated prices.” Id. But see Chon, supra note 142, at 443 (suggesting that failure to recognize or
act upon structural inequalities is a contemporary, post–civil rights movement form of discrimi-
nation).
155. The most recent reports on the digital divide herald great increases in connectivity gen-
erally, but also a widening gap in rates of connectivity between certain populations including
blacks and Hispanics. See Falling Through the Net, supra note 147 (“Black and Hispanics . . .
continue to experience the lowest household Internet penetration rates at 23.5% and 23.6% re-
spectively.”).
156. Margaret Chon, Radical Plural Democracy and the Internet, 33 CAL. W. L. REV. 143
(1997).
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rested for sending e-mail messages describing sexual fantasies of rape
and torture.157 A female student shares how her initial reaction (“that
the government never should have brought the case against Baker”)
changed after a personal experience: she was nearly raped after her
car broke down.158 It turned out that the American Automobile Asso-
ciation was posting the locations of stranded motorists on its website,
making it easy for anyone to find them.159 Chon’s story is not just
about direct spillover. The story also is about the different ways in
which the Internet will affect different members of society in their
online and offline interactions. It strikes a stark contrast to Johnson’s
blithe comment that “[y]ou might in theory be ‘psychologically raped’
online, but it just doesn’t happen very often in practice, because it’s a
lot easier to leave a threatening or unwelcome virtual situation than a
real one.”160 The primary subject of Chon’s essay is the Internet’s ex-
pansion of the market for mail-order brides from the Philippines.
Women forced by poverty to sell themselves into slavery offer an im-
portant counterpoint to the digital libertarian faith in easy exit.161
Both examples offered by Chon point to the fact that the electronic
space of the computer screen and the flesh-and-bone space of the us-
ers is a two-way street. As much as real-world conditions impact the
Internet, the Internet is also itself a real-world condition.
The fallout over the Communications Decency Act (CDA) pro-
vides another angle on the overly narrow conception of government
that reigns among Internet fans. The story of the CDA,162 a poorly
conceived, unconstitutional ban on Internet pornography that was
strongly opposed by a wide variety of Internet and free speech de-
fenders, is generally recounted as a libertarian parable of how gov-
ernment interference is inherently liberty-reducing. Admittedly, the
CDA, if constitutional, would have been a threat to free expression
on the Internet. But the narrative of its defeat obscures an equally in-
structive story about the narrowness of the libertarian conception of
government. The CDA was a small part of the massive Telecommu-
nications Act of 1996. A less-noted section of that act created a 3%
excise tax on telephone companies to fund Internet access in schools
157. Id. at 144; see also LESSIG, supra note 12, at 15-17 (discussing the Jake Baker story and
its implications for thinking about law in cyberspace).
158. Chon, supra note 156, at 144.
159. Id.
160. Johnson, supra note 60, at 5.
161. Chon, supra note 156, at 148.
162. See supra notes 38-44 and accompanying text.
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and libraries.163 These two forms of intervention describe two very dif-
ferent activities that a government may pursue. The first, to which
civil libertarians and defenders of the Internet reacted very loudly,
was a vision of an Internet sanitized by congressional censorship. The
second, entirely ignored by these defenders of the Internet, was a vi-
sion of the government taking active steps to broaden access.164 Lead-
ers within the Internet community who spoke out against the CDA,165
but ignored the access funding provision, reduced these two capacities
of government to a single one in which the government is the enemy
of the free Internet. Three years later, House Republicans introduced
two bills to kill or reduce the fund,166 despite the fact that a 1999
Commerce Department study found that the gap between Internet
haves and have-nots had widened during the last few years of Internet
explosion. The claim that cyberspace is “everywhere but nowhere,” a
utopian dream of human equality, turns out to mask political realities.
These political realities, which do not simply vanish across the wire
like a sent e-mail message, can only be addressed by turning utopian
claims (“everywhere but nowhere”) into political goals.
CONCLUSION
The Internet does not exist apart from the world in which it was
created and in which its users, and those who are not yet its users, re-
163. The program is known as the E-Rate Program, 47 U.S.C. § 254 (Supp. IV 1998).
164. Streeter, supra note 2, at 60. Streeter describes how the computer community and the
media misguidedly focused their entire attention on the CDA while missing the greater political
implications of the bill’s corporate welfarism and the single progressive provision, the universal
service fund. Since the provision was passed unnoticed, it was an uncontroversial matter for
Congress to quietly introduce a bill to slash the fund.
165. Janelle Brown, CDA—The Sequel, SALON, at http://www.salon.com/21st/feature/1998/
09/23feature2.html (Sept. 23, 1998) (referring to the original CDA protests and the protestors’
tendency to view themselves entirely opposed to government regulation of the Internet in any
form) (on file with the Duke Law Journal).
166. See Schools and Libraries Internet Access Act, H.R. 1746, 106th Cong. (1999) (pro-
posing to amend the Communications Act of 1934 to repeal provisions authorizing the FCC to
take certain action to provide access to advanced telecommunications services for school, health
care providers, and libraries, and reducing IRS and excise taxes paid for telephone and other
communication services). The bill has been referred to the Ways and Means Committee. 145
CONG. REC. H2997 (daily ed. May 11, 1999) Another bill, known as the E-Rate Termination
Act, was introduced in the same session to repeal a section of a bill (passed the previous year)
that set aside a portion of the fee charged for registration or renewal of second-level Internet
domain names. H.R. 692, 106th Cong. (1999) (proposing elimination of 47 U.S.C. § 254). For an
excellent summary of the continuing controversy of the E-Rate program, see Jessica Malman,
Note, Connecting Students to ‘The Net’: Guiding Principles from State Constitutions, 7 GEO. J.
POV. L. & POL’Y 53, 82 n.174 (2000).
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side. Claims of dematerialism are not just descriptively false, they are
normative statements motivated by a particular political goal: the tri-
umph of private, market-based decisionmaking. While one can sym-
pathize with and even share in a fantasy of escape, via cyberspace
travel, from the tediously fractious and difficult human condition, this
fantasy is not a useful premise on which to base public policy. With
growing political and economic realities such as the recent AOL–
Time Warner merger, it is essential to acknowledge that power
structures already exist in cyberspace. Acknowledging that politics is
inevitable allows us to shift the discussion to the question of what
style of politics is preferable. While there is certainly room for
freedom from government intervention in some areas, and a need for
protection of property in others, neither of these goals is currently at
risk in the same way as the public aspect of the Internet. For this
reason, it is critical that policymakers and other students of the
Internet carefully consider the broader implications of the argument
for privatization.
